In this article, we study automated agents that are designed to encourage humans to take some actions over others by strategically disclosing key pieces of information. To this end, we utilize the framework of persuasion games-a branch of game theory that deals with asymmetric interactions where one player (Sender) possesses more information about the world, but it is only the other player (Receiver) who can take an action. In particular, we use an extended persuasion model, where the Sender's information is imperfect and the Receiver has more than two alternative actions available. We design a computational algorithm that, from the Sender's standpoint, calculates the optimal information disclosure rule. The algorithm is parameterized by the Receiver's decision model (i.e., what choice he will make based on the information disclosed by the Sender) and can be retuned accordingly.
INTRODUCTION
Computer systems have a major role in providing information to humans. This information may either be via the Web (search engine, news etc.), GPS systems, or decision support systems. This information is not always ingenuous; at times, this information may be intended to influence a user into performing some actions rather than others. In this article, we focus on scenarios in which an automated agent interacting with humans possesses greater information than them. The automated agent needs to reveal information to humans, thereby leading them to perform actions that are preferable to the agent.
Game theory, particularly involving persuasion games, is the most popular discipline that studies strategic reasoning as required by the mixed intelligent systems on which we are concentrating. In such games (e.g., Crawford and Sobel [1982] , Glazer and Rubinstein [2006] , and Kamenica and Gentzkow [2010] ) two rational entities interact: a Sender and a Receiver. The Sender provides information and is assumed to be more knowledgeable, and the Receiver performs an action based on the information received.
Some examples may be Google Maps [Google 2013a] or Waze [Google 2013b ] applications: they know the possible settings that influence traffic congestion in the relevant countries and their times (e.g., morning rush hours) and have a distribution over the time it takes to drive on most of the roads. Similarly, automated travel agents have a lot of prior information on flights and the distribution over their delays.
In this work, we extend these game-theoretical models as follows. Although the agent holds private information (i.e., unknown to the user), it is also uncertain about the exact current state of the world. For example, the system may have an estimation of the congestion of traffic on different roads that may be unknown to the user. Still, the system may have only an estimation and not the exact value of traffic density at a particular time. We consider the setting of a one-shot interaction where the agent presents the user with information and the user chooses an action based on this information. The agent can present partial information about the state; however, any information revealed by the agent must be true (unlike other work that considers manipulating the information presented to the user, such as Sarne et al. [2011] ). The utility functions of both parties are different, but both depend on the state of the world and the action performed by the user. We model this setting as an optimization problem for the Sender and present an algorithm for solving it.
Following the game theory solution might not be the best strategy for an agent interacting with humans for the following reasons. First, humans are not necessarily rational decision makers, and therefore the agent needs to be able to model its user's reaction to the information that it provides and plan accordingly. Second, people are known to discount the advice that they obtain from experts (e.g., see Yaniv and Kleinberger [2000] , Bonaccio and Dalal [2006] , and Kuang et al. [2007] for the case when the adviser has a monetary stake in the advice provided). For example, drivers may prefer not to pay a toll even if this decision will result in driving for a longer period of time on a more congested road. The system, on the other hand, may at times prefer to notify its drivers about a vacant toll-free road if the toll roads have heavy traffic. An intelligent traffic center needs to reason about the effect of its notifications on the toll collection for the day, on the resulting congestion for the toll-free road, and on the user's possible reaction to the revealed information.
To face the challenge of human deviation from fully rational behavior, we present the linear weighted utility quantal response (LUQ) human model, which relies on the following two assumptions: linear weighted utility, in which people's subjective utility is a linear combination of attributes, and logit quantal response, in which the probability that people will chose a certain action is proportional to the action's subjective utility.
We ran extensive evaluations involving a total of more than 700 human subjects in two different domains. One considers a road selection problem (described in Section 5.1), and the second one considers a supply-demand interaction detailed in Section 5.2. We discovered that in the road selection problem domain, people deviated from rational behavior and therefore an agent based on the LUQ method significantly outperformed a game theory-based agent. However, in the supply-demand domain, people behaved nearly rationally, and thus the LUQ-based agent and the game theorybased agent's performance did not differ significantly.
To summarize, our key contributions in this article are as follows:
-An extended persuasion game model for human-agent interaction with asymmetric information and two-sided uncertainty -A formal solution algorithm for the model, parameterized by the Receiver (human) behavior model -The LUQ method for building a human behavioral model pertinent to the SenderReceiver type of interaction -A methodology determining when one can assume rational behavior and thus use the game theory approach and when one should use the LUQ method.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the necessary background to our work and positions our article relative to other persuasion studies. Section 3 formally defines the interaction model that we consider, whereas Section 4 provides its theoretical analysis and an algorithmic solution. Our experimental designs and results begin in Section 5, which describes bounded rationality models of human decisions, both general and specific to our experimental domains. Section 6 describes the exact experimental setup and parameters that we used for our domains and describes the experimental outcomes and statistics. Finally, we give some concluding remarks in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
In our preliminary work [Azaria et al. 2011] , we considered an information disclosure game in which only one side, the Receiver, had incomplete information about the state of the world, whereas the Sender had full information regarding the state of the world. In this work, we explicitly deviate from this assumption and force the Sender to deal with incomplete information resulting in a two-sided uncertainty game. We furthermore provide the full proofs in the theoretical section, conduct new experiments, and add an extra domain that yields interesting results.
Related scenarios to our problems are settings where advice giving can influence the decision making of the advice taker (e.g., see Bonaccio and Dalal [2006] for a taxonomy). Human players participating in a coordination game were found to accept a third party's advice, even though this third party has selfish interests in the game's outcome [Kuang et al. 2007 ]. Furthermore, communication will affect human players even if it comes from their opponents, who are directly involved in the game (e.g., see Liebrand [1984] ). As a result, manipulative information exchange between players becomes an issue to exploit. For example, travel guidance systems have been studied for their effects on the commuting dynamics [Mahmassani and Liu 1999; Chorus et al. 2006] .
Game theory researchers have long studied the manipulative interactions in the context of persuasion games (e.g., see Milgrom and Roberts [1986] , Crawford and Sobel [1982] ). In these games, the Sender (the highly informed player) attempts to calculate and find the portion of information that will yield the maximum persuasive effectthat is, that will prompt the Receiver (player capable of acting in the world, and whose actions determine the welfare of both players) to choose an action that is most beneficial for the Sender rather than the Receiver itself. Although this interaction narrative is common to all works utilizing the game theoretic persuasion, its detailed formalizations vary significantly. For example, Glazer and Rubinstein [2006] and Rayo and Segal [2010] study the case where the Receiver has only two options: either accept the action associated with the world's current state or decline it. Such would be the case, for instance, if following or skipping a sponsored search link. The search engine would play the role of the Sender and provide additional information about the sponsored link, whereas the browsing Receiver would consider the relevance of the link from its point of view. In contrast, Kamenica and Gentzkow [2010] , as well as our current work, view scenarios where the set of action alternatives is greater than the simple binary choice. Another parameter of a persuasion game model is the amount of knowledge that the Sender has about the world and the Receiver. For instance, Turkay Pillai [2009] assumes that the Receiver may have some private information (a type) and studies how the Sender can refine its knowledge of the Receiver's utility over time. In contrast, our model of the interaction is single shot, where such a refinement is not possible. We also assume an additional impediment for the Sender, specifically that it does not have complete knowledge of the state of the world.
Interestingly, the assumption of complete information is not limited to game-theoretic persuasion approaches. In a recent work in e-Commerce, Hajaj et al. [2013] consider comparison shopping agents (CSAs). They suggest a set of methods for affecting users' decisions based on selective disclosure of information, aiming to influence users not to query additional CSAs. However, Hajaj et al. do not allow the presentation of uncertain information, using probabilities as we do, but merely allow the agent to decide whether to present a certain shop or not. Fenster et al. [2012] design an agent that influences human decision making in a conversational setting. Their agent tries to convince the human by providing examples for her to emulate or by providing justifications for a certain choice. The work studied an environment where the human had to select a location for a school. The agent interacted with the human and attempted to convince her to choose a certain location. However, in a striking contrast to our work, Fenster et al. [2012] have no uncertainty involved.
Although game theory has provided a wide variety of persuasive models and methods, the core assumption of rationality and equilibrium choice remain. Yet, following equilibrium strategies is often less beneficial in practical applications, where agents need to interact with people (e.g., see Hoz-Weiss et al. [2008] , Peled et al. [2011] , and Azaria et al. [2012a] ). Thus, there is a need to develop persuasion solutions where an alternative (bounded-rational or learned/mined) decision model of human behavior can be easily incorporated. Indeed, such interaction methods, which are capable of combining psychological factors and human decision making theory with machine learning methods toward creating a human model, have been demonstrated to be successful (e.g., see Rosenfeld et al. [2012] , Gal and Pfeffer [2007] , Oshrat et al. [2009] , Rosenfeld and Kraus [2011] , Peled et al. [2011] , and Azaria et al. [2012b Azaria et al. [ , 2012c ).
THE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE GAME WITH TWO-SIDED UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we formally describe the protocol of the interaction between the human user and the advising agent. To this end, we will use the terminology and general format of (Bayesian) persuasion games [Kamenica and Gentzkow 2010] (hence, naming the human user a Receiver and the agent a Sender) and a guided route selection example as intuition.
The game describes an asymmetric interaction between two players: a Sender and a Receiver. The Receiver has a privately observed type associated with it (θ ∈ ) that is sampled from a commonly known distribution (θ ∼ p ). The Sender can send messages to the Receiver, and the Receiver can perform actions from a set A. The utilities of the interaction between the players depend on the state of the world v ∈ V that is sampled independently from the commonly known distribution v ∼ p V . The Sender can obtain an observation of the state of the world ω ∈ that is sampled from the commonly known distribution ω ∼ p (·|v). The utilities of the interaction between the players are given by two functions: u s : V × A → R for the Sender and u r : V × × A → R for the Receiver.
In our example, θ can correspond to the tolerance or patience exhibited by a driver and influence his utility (see later discussion). The messages sent by the Sender naturally correspond to the traffic management center sending route information. The action chosen by the Receiver corresponds to the driver choosing a specific route. The state of the world corresponds to different traffic conditions across the road network with an appropriate statistic. The traffic management center can monitor the traffic conditions with some degree of uncertainty. The utility functions in our example scenario describe how content the user would be (u r ) if he took a specific route (a ∈ A) given his patience (θ ∈ ) and current traffic conditions (v ∈ V ) and, respectively (u s ), how profitable it would be for the traffic management center if the driver adopted a particular route (a ∈ A) given the current traffic conditions (v ∈ V ).
The game unfolds as follows:
-The Sender selects a finite set of messages, M, and a disclosure rule π : → (M), where (·) denotes the space of all distributions over a set. In other words, the disclosure rule specifies the probability π (m|ω) of sending a message m given any possible Sender's observation ω. Note that v is unknown (even through observation) to the Sender at the time of computing this disclosure rule. We will refer to the disclosure rule as the Sender's policy. -The Sender computes the effective disclosure rule π (m|v) = ω∈ π (m|ω) p (ω|v).
-The Sender declares and commits to (π , M). -Players obtain their respective utilities u s (v, a) and u r (v, θ, a) .
SOLVING INFORMATION DISCLOSURE GAMES WITH TWO-SIDED UNCERTAINTY
To solve the information disclosure game, we represent it as a mathematical program (that can be nonlinear). Solving such a problem consists of maximizing the expected utility of the Sender by using a particular protocol that chooses what messages to send given its observation of the state of the world. At the same time, the action selection policy of the Receiver contributes the bounding conditions of this mathematical program.
In this section, we analyze such games formally and provide a solution, assuming that the Receiver is fully rational.
is selecting the disclosure rule (we analyze the game as if a third party sends the message to the Receiver based on the disclosure rule given to him by the Sender). In the SP equilibrium, the Receiver's strategy is the best response to the Sender's policy, simplifying the equilibrium calculations [Osborne and Rubinstein 1994] .
We limit the possible states of the world V , the Receiver types , the set of observations , and the Receiver actions A to finite sets (we refer to this as the finite sets assumption). Let p b V denote the beliefs of the Receiver about the state of the world. The Receiver will choose an optimal action:
The set of feasible responses can be limited even further if the disclosure rule π is given. By strategically constructing the rule π , the Sender can influence the actions chosen by the Receiver. Since the Sender has only partial knowledge of the private value θ of the Receiver, the Sender can only compute a prediction of a *
Having precomputed the response function p A of the Receiver, the Sender can calculate the expected utility of a specific disclosure rule π (we removed the details of the simple mathematical manipulations):
Since we have assumed that V , , and M are finite, we can formulate the disclosure rule construction as an optimization problem over the space of stochastic policies π (m|ω) and the message space M:
The following theorem shows that if an optimal solution exists, then the set of messages selected by the Sender can be limited to the size of | |. Theorem 4.1 shows that an optimal solution with a finite message space can be transformed so that the set of messages does not exceed | |. However, it is possible to question whether an optimal solution with a finite message set in fact exists. The following theorem deals with that question, demonstrating that a countable set of messages of an optimal solution can always be replaced by a finite set.
with the finite sets assumption (i.e., V , , and A are finite) , if the optimal U s is attainable by some protocol (π, M), then there is an optimal solution with a finite message space.
We give the complete proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 in Appendix A rather than here due to their technicality. Their intuition, however, is easily outlined. For Theorem 4.1, we show that the effects induced by the extra messages can be achieved by distributing the information that they transfer to other messages without effecting the Sender's utility. The redistribution process relies on the linear properties of the disclosure rule as a matrix. In turn, for Theorem 4.2, we show that the utility gains obtained from almost all but a finite number of messages is negligible, and so is the information that they provide to the Receiver. In fact, they can be aggregated into a single message (thus reducing the total number of used messages to finite) without impacting the Sender's utility.
Finding an Optimal Policy
Unfortunately, directly finding an optimal policy by solving the disclosure rule maximization problem presented in Equation (2) is intractable, since it includes a strongly nonlinear component. More specifically, it assumes availability of the Receiver's best response (defined by Equation 1) in a (closed) functional form. However, it is possible to circumvent this hindrance. Instead of assuming a functional best response form, we expand Equation (2) by a set of constraints that compare the Receiver's utility from its chosen action to that of all other actions available to him or her. In other words, we transform an explicit (functional) nonlinear representation of the Receiver's response into an implicit (constraints-based) linear form.
We begin by generating messages for each possible response from the Receiver. Note that the response will depend on the Receiver's type. Formally, we define a set of functions:
→ A}. f specifies an action for each Receiver's type. For each function f, we create a set of messages. From Theorem 4.1, we know that for an optimal policy, there is a need for at most | | messages. Therefore, there is no need for more than | | messages to lead to a specific behavior that is described by a function f . Thus, we create a set M of messages such that for every f ∈ F, we generate messages denoted by m j f , 1 ≤ j ≤ | |. Using this set of messages with a size of | ||F|, we would like to consider possible policies and choose the one that maximizes the Sender's expected utility. However, we need to focus only on policies π where given a message m j f , a Receiver of type θ will really choose an action f (θ ). We achieve this formally by designing a set of inequalities that express this condition as follows.
First, given a message m ∈ M, a Receiver of type θ ∈ , and a policy π , the Receiver will choose an action a ∈ A only if he believes that his expected utility from this action is higher than his expected utility from any other action. Note that after receiving a message m, the Receiver's belief that the state of the world is v ∈ V is proportionate to p V (v)π (m|v). Thus, the set of constraints is
Focusing on a specific message m j f , we want to satisfy these constraints for any type θ ∈ and require that the chosen action will be f (θ ). Putting these together after some mathematical manipulations, we obtain the following constraints for ∀θ ∈ and ∀a ∈ A:
Note that there may be many functions for which we will not be able to find an effective policy π that will satisfy the required constraints. However, given such a π and a function f, we can calculate the probability π A (a|m j f ) that an action a ∈ A will be chosen when the Receiver gets the message m j f , regardless of his type. Formally, given a set
Putting it all together, we obtain the following optimization problem:
The complexity of solving the optimization problem within the preceding algorithm is polynomial in |A|, |V |, and | | but exponential in | | since |F| ∝ |A| | | . We refer to this agent as the game theory-based agent (GTBA).
PEOPLE MODELING FOR DISCLOSURE GAMES IN MULTIATTRIBUTE SELECTION PROBLEMS
Trying to influence people's action selection presents novel problems for the design of persuasion agents. People often do not adhere to the optimal, monolithic strategies that can be derived analytically. Their decision-making process is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors [Camerer 2003 ]. For this reason, in addition to the theoretical analysis, we propose to model people participating in information disclosure games and integrate that model into the formal one. We assume that the agent interacts with each person only once, and thus we propose a general opponent modeling approach-in other words, when facing a specific person, the persuasion agent will use models learned from data collected from other people. The opponent modeling is based on two assumptions of human decision making:
-Linear weighted utility: People's decision making deviates from rational choice theory; they use a subjective utility function, which is a linear combination of a set of attributes. This utility function may divert from the expected monetary utility function. -Logit quantal response (stochastic decision making): People do not choose actions that maximize their subjective utility but rather choose actions proportional to this utility. A formal model of such decision making has been shown in Lee [2006] and Daw et al. [2006] to be of the following form:
We name this method for human modeling the linear weighted utility quantal response (LUQ). (This method also proved to be successful in modeling human behavior in security games [Nguyen et al. 2013] .) The study of the general opponent approach and its comparison with the formal model was done in the context of two games: the multiattribute road selection problem with two-sided uncertainty about road traffic and the sandwich game with two-sided uncertainty regarding the number of attendees of a particular event. Next we describe the two games and explain their differences.
Multiattribute Road Selection Problem with Two-Sided Uncertainty
The multiattribute road selection problem with two-sided uncertainty about the state of the world is an extension of the game that was studied in Azaria et al. [2011] . It is defined as an information disclosure game ρ with two players: a driver and a center. The center, playing the role of the Sender, can provide the driver, playing the role of the Receiver, with traffic information about road conditions. In particular, the driver needs to arrive at a meeting place in θ minutes. There is a set H of n highways and roads leading to his meeting location. Each road h ∈ H is associated with a toll cost c(h). There are several levels of traffic load L on the roads and a set of highway network states V . A highway network state is a vector v ∈ V specifying the load of each road (i.e., v =< l 1 , . . . , l n >, l i ∈ L). The traffic load yields a different time duration for the trip denoted d ( v h , h) , where v h denotes the traffic load on road h in state v. If the driver arrives at the meeting on time, he gains g dollars; however, he is penalized e dollars for each minute he is late. Denote the chosen road by a. Putting this together, the driver's monetary utility is given by
The driver does not know the exact state of the highway network but merely has a prior distribution belief p V over V . The center also does not know what the exact state of the highway network will be when the driver drives along the chosen road (e.g., even though the traffic flows on a given road, an accident can occur shortly and the road will be blocked). However, given its observations, the center has a better estimation of the state of the roads. The center has only prior beliefs, p , regarding the possible meeting times, . Once given the observations on the state, the center sends a message m to the driver that may reveal data about the traffic load of the various roads. The center's utility depends on the actual traffic load and the driver's chosen road u s ( v a , a). It increases with the toll road c(a) and decreases with a's load as specified in v (see two examples of such utility functions later in our article). The center must decide on a disclosure rule and provide it to the driver in advance (before the center is given some information on the road loads). For the center, the road selection problem is therefore as such: given a game = H, L, V, , M, c, d, p V , p , u s , u r , choose a disclosure rule that will maximize E[u s ].
The Sandwich Game
The sandwich game is defined as an information disclosure game σ with two players: a seller and an organizer. The organizer, playing the role of the Sender, can provide the seller, playing the role of the Receiver, with information regarding the anticipated conference attendees. The organizer himself receives noisy information regarding the exact number of attendees, which can be interpreted as the number of people who registered to the conference during the preconference registration. The seller must decide in advance how many sandwiches to prepare for the conference (a). The sandwiches are sold for a fixed pricec, and it is assumed that each conference attendee buys a single sandwich. Each seller is associated with a private type θ, which indicates the cost for preparing each possible number of sandwiches. Thus, the seller's monetary utility given the number of attendees (v), the number of sandwiches prepared (a), and θ are given by u r (v, θ, a) = min{a, v} ·c − θ (a). Depending on the actual conference size, the organizer is assumed to have some preferences as to the number of sandwiches prepared by the seller (u s (v, a) ).
Hypothesis
In the original road selection problem presented in Azaria et al. [2011] , which considered only one-sided uncertainty, the agent using the general opponent modeling approach achieved a significantly higher utility than the GTBA. The major cause for this effect is that people preferred not to choose jammed roads in the game even when they could be on time to their meetings and therefore did not attempt to maximize their monetary values. Thus, we hypothesize that a similar agent (relying on the LUQ method for human modeling) for the two-sided uncertainty road selection problem will also outperform the GTBA in the extended game. In addition, we designed the sandwich game-a new game in which the goal of the players is to maximize their monetary values. We expect that in such situations, people's behavior will be more motivated to maximize their expected monetary values, and GTBA may perform similar to an agent relying on the LUQ method for human modeling.
Nonmonetary Utility Estimation for the Road Selection Problem with Two-Sided Uncertainty
based on the LUQ method for human modeling, we assume that the driver chooses the road based on a nonmonetary subjective utility function, denotedū ρ (here and in the functions defined later, we omit ρ when it is clear from the context). We further assume thatū is a linear combination of three parameters given the chosen road: travel time, road load, and the toll of the road. We associate different weights (αs) with each of these parameters: α d for the trip duration time, α c for the toll cost, and for all l i ∈ L we have α l i . That is, given a game ρ , assuming that the driver knew the highway network load v and chose road a,
Note that the utility associated with a given road depends only on the given road and its load and not on the load of other roads according to the state. We assume that the user uses logit quantal response, and therefore, given ρ , we assume that the driver chooses road h with a probability of
where λ is a parameter. However, sinceū ρ ( v, h) has an extra degree of freedom, we set λ = 1. When choosing an action, the driver does not know v but only m. Thus, the probability of choosing a road h is
Consider a set of games G ρ such that they all have the same set of levels of traffic load.
To learn the weights of the subjective utility function associated with G ρ , we assume that a set of training data is given. The examples in consist of tuples ( i ρ , m, a) specifying that a subject playing the driver's role in the game i ρ ∈ G ρ chose road a ∈ H after receiving the message m ∈ M. We further assume that there is a predefined threshold τ > 0, and for each m that appears in , there are at least τ examples. Denote by prop( i ρ , m, a) the fraction of examples in of subjects who, when playing i ρ and receiving message m, chose road a. Next, given , we aim to find appropriate αs that minimize the mean square error between the prediction and the actual distribution of the actions given in the set of examples . Note that we propose to learn αs across all of the games in G ρ . Formally, we search for αs that minimize
One may notice that the subjective utility function that we propose does not depend on the meeting time θ . This is because the meeting time θ is a private value of the driver and therefore is not specified in the examples in . However, since we are interested in the expected overall response per message of the whole population and not in predicting each individual response, if the distribution of the meeting time is left unchanged, dependence on the meeting time is embedded in the utility results. (We actually learn p m A directly and therefore do not depend on θ ). Next, given a specific ρ , we incorporate the learned function p(a = h|m) as an instantiation of p m A into the calculation of the expected utility of a disclosure rule:
Unfortunately, it means that U s [π ] has a very nontrivial shape (involving positive and negative exponential and polynomial expressions of its argument), and even such properties as convexity were hard to verify analytically. As a result, we chose to use the standard pattern search algorithm to find a reasonable approximation of the optimal disclosure rule with respect to U s [π ] .
Nonmonetary Utility Estimation for the Sandwich Game with Two-Sided Uncertainty
Based on the LUQ method for human modeling, we assume that the seller decides on the number of sandwiches to prepare based on the following subjective utility function:
That is, the seller tries to maximize the number of sandwiches sold and minimize the number of sandwiches thrown away (we anticipate that α 2 will be negative). For similar reasons to those mentioned in Section 5.4, the proposed subjective utility function does not depend on θ . According to LUQ, we assume logit quantal response. Learning these αs and building an optimal policy is conducted in a method identical to that of the road selection problem. Each of these proposed agents that rely on the LUQ method (for each of the two domains) will be referred to as the LUQ agent (LUQA).
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our experiments are aimed at answering three questions:
(1) How well did the GTBA that finds the optimal policy of the information disclosure game do, assuming that people choose the best response according to u r (GTBA)? (2) Does LUQA improve the Sender's results in comparison to GTBA? (3) Do the answers to the preceding questions depend on the domain, and if so, given a domain, can we provide a way to predict whether LUQA or GTBA will perform better?
Experimental Design
In both games, the subjects were given the description of the game including the Sender's preferences. Before starting to play, the subjects were required to answer a few questions verifying that they understood the game. For each subject, the center received a state drawn randomly and sent a message using the disclosure rule described in Section 3. To support the subjects' decision making, we presented them with the distribution over the possible states that was calculated using the Bayesian rule given the message, the prior uniform distribution, and the center's policy. That is, the subjects were given p M V (m). The subjects then selected a single action (either a number of sandwiches to prepare or a road). As a motivation, the subjects received bonuses proportionate to the amount that they gained in dollars. Comparisons between different means were performed using t-tests.
We considered two variations for each of the two games (the sandwich game and the road selection game). The first one was used for answering the first question and to collect data for the opponent modeling procedure. The second variation was used for answering the second question, using the collected data of the first variation as the training dataset. We now describe the parameters used for both variations of the sandwich game and the road selection game.
6.1.1. Road Selection Game. In the first game, 1 , the players had to choose one of three roads: a toll free road, a $4 toll road, or an $8 toll road (i.e., H = {h 1 , h 2 , h 3 }, c(h 1 ) = 0, c(h 2 ) = 4 and c(h 3 ) = 8). Each road could either have flowing traffic that would result in a 3-minute ride, heavy traffic that would take 9 minutes of travel time, or a traffic jam that would cause the ride to take 18 minutes. That is, L = { f lowing, heavy, jam}, and d(h i , f lowing) = 3, d(h i , heavy) = 9, and d(h i , jam) = 18, for all h i ∈ H. An example of a state v could be heavy, f lowing, f lowing , indicating that there is heavy traffic on the toll-free road and traffic is flowing on the other two toll roads. Arriving on time (or earlier) yields the player a gain of $23, and he will be penalized $1 for every minute that he is late. Finally, the meeting could take place in either 3, 6, 9, 12, or 15 minutes (i.e., = {3, 6, 9, 12, 15}). Thus, u r ( v, a, θ) = 23 − max{d(a, v) − w, 0} · 1. The prior probabilities over V and W were uniform. The center's utility was as follows. If the subject took the toll-free road, the center received $0 regardless of the state. If the subject took the $4 toll road, the center received $4 if the traffic was flowing, $2 if there was heavy traffic, and $0 if there was a traffic jam. If the subject took the $8 toll road, the center received $8 if the traffic was flowing, $2 if there was heavy traffic, and lost $4 if there was a traffic jam.
In the second game, 2 , the meeting time was changed to be in 12, 13, 14, and 15 minutes (i.e., = {12, 13, 14, 15}). The center's utility was also changed: the center received $1 if the driver chose the most expensive road among those with the least traffic. Otherwise, the center received $0. 6.1.2. Sandwich Game. The conference size (v) had either no participants (a canceled conference), 20 participants (a small conference), 30 participants (a medium conference), 40 participants (a large conference), or 50 participants (a huge conference).
The number of sandwiches prepared by the seller (a) was in {0, 20, 30, 40, 50} as well. Recall that the seller's utility function is given by u r (v, θ, a) = min{a, v} ·c − θ (a). We setc (the sandwich retail price) to $1. We used three different private types types (θ ), which indicate the cost for preparing each possible number of sandwiches. Table I shows the different private types used.
We considered two different utility functions for the organizer in the sandwich game. In the first game, 1 σ , the system wanted the seller to prepare more sandwiches than needed, unless the conference had 50 attendees. In 2 σ , the system wanted the seller toprepare fewer sandwiches than needed, unless the conference was canceled (0 attendees). The utility function was chosen such that the utility for the organizer and the seller will be different and not linearly dependent. The observation table is shown in Table II . As can be seen in the table, if the organizer observes that the conference will be canceled, then in fact it will be. In any other case, there is an 85% chance that the organizer will observe the correct state. Even if the state observed is incorrect, the actual state is not too far off, unless the conference is unexpectedly canceled.
Human Subjects
In the experiments, subjects were asked to play either the sandwich game or the multiattribute road selection game with two-sided uncertainty. As mentioned earlier, each of the games had two different variations that differed in the system utility function. Each subject played only once. All of our experiments were run using Amazon's Mechanical Turk service [Amazon 2013 ]. 2 Participation in our study consisted of 713 subjects from the United States: 56.2% were women and 43.8% were men. The subjects' ages ranged from 18 to 74 years, with a mean age of 34 years and a standard deviation of 11.3. The subjects participated in the following experiments: -Using GTBA, 173 subjects participated in 1 ρ , which is the first game played in the road selection game. -Using GTBA, 102 subjects participated in 2 ρ , which is the second game played in the road selection game. -Using LUQA, 119 subjects participated in 2 ρ , which is the second game played in the road selection game. -Using GTBA, 100 subjects participated in 1 σ , which is the first game played in the sandwich game. -Using GTBA, 106 subjects participated in 2 σ , which is the second game played in the sandwich game. -Using LUQA, 113 subjects participated in 2 σ , which is the second game played in the sandwich game.
Since the experiment was based on a single multiple-choice question, we were concerned that subjects might not truly attempt to find a good solution. Therefore, we only selected workers with a good reputation; they were required to pass a test before starting, and they received relatively high bonuses proportionate to the monetary utility gained. We removed six answers that were produced in less than 10 seconds as being unreasonably fast. However, the average time needed to solve our task was 83 seconds. We concluded that the subjects considered our tasks seriously. Fig. 1 . System utility in road game 1 ρ . The center gained a significantly higher utility from the actual users than the utility it would have gained if all of the users were rational ( p < 0.001). ρ . The actual drivers gained a significantly lower utility, on average, than they would have gained if they would all act rationally ( p < 0.001).
Experimental Results
In both the sandwich game and the multiattribute road selection game with two-sided uncertainty, we first let the subjects play with the GTBA. This agent computes the game theory-based policy of 1 , solving the maximization problem presented in Section 4. Note that although the complexity of solving this problem is high, we were able to find the optimal policy for the multiattribute selection games in a reasonable amount of time.
Results of the Multiattribute Road Selection Game with Two-Sided Uncertainty
6.4.1. GTBA Results. The policy of GTBA using the first settings ( 1 ρ ) included 13 messages; however, 5 of them were generated with a very low probability. Thus, from the 169 subjects participating in the experiment, most of them (166 subjects) received one of 8 messages, and three of the subjects each received a different message.
The center received, on average, 0.230 per driver. This result is significantly ( p < 0.001) higher than the utility that the center would have received if all of the subjects were rational (i.e., maximizing u r ), which, in expectation, was only 0.105 per driver ( Figure 1 ). As can be seen in Figure 2 ,user performance significantly dropped from that of fully rational. Another deviation from full rationality was observed by the correlation between the time to the meeting and the road selection. For a fully rational player, the longer he has until the meeting, the less likely he is to choose a toll road. However, this negative correlation between the time to the meeting and the road selection was as low as −0.015, suggesting that subjects almost ignored the meeting time. These observations lead to the conclusion that in the multiattribute road selection game with two-sided uncertainty, humans tend to concentrate on the traffic on each road and its toll but ignore the actual monetary value that supports our general opponent modeling approach for this domain.
6.4.2. LUQ Human Model. We tested four different methods of modeling human decision making:
(1) Rational, which assumes that humans always choose the road that maximizes their expected monetary value given in Equation (5). This method is the method assumed by the GTBA and does not require any additional parameters. (2) QRE (logit quantal response), which assumes that the probability of humans choosing a road is proportionate to the expected monetary value from that road. This method is based on Equation (7); however, it assumes that the drivers base their ( v, a, θ) given in Equation (5)) rather than using the subjective utility function (ū ρ ( v, a)) (as assumed by LUQ). Therefore, this method has a single parameter: λ. (3) LWU (linear weighted utility), which assumes that humans always choose the road that gives them the highest subjective utility (using the subjective utility function u ρ ( v, a) given in Equation (6). This method has five parameters. (4) LUQ, which combines both linear weighted utility function and logit quantal response, given in Equations (6) and (7). This method has five parameters. Table III presents the mean square error for all four methods on the data from 1 ρ using a leave-one-out cross-validation (in which for each of the messages, when the mean square error is evaluated on a messages, the parameters are learned using data from all other messages). Clearly, LUQ's prediction outperforms all other methods.
6.4.3. Comparing LUQA and GTBA. Using the settings of the second game, 2 ρ , we ran two agents: GTBA and LUQA. We used the results obtained from the 166 subjects who played 1 ρ as the training set data for LUQA. That is, the αs forū 2 ρ r were learned from the subjects playing 1 ρ (i.e., G = { 1 }). LUQA and GTBA each generated four messages for 2 ρ , and 119 subjects played with LUQA and 102 with GTBA. LUQA performed significantly better ( p < 0.05) than GTBA, gaining an average of 0.431 versus 0.319 points per driver (Figure 3) .
We also checked the actual dollars earned by the subjects. Unfortunately, when playing with LUQA, the average virtual gain per subject was only $19.00, whereas when playing with GTBA, the average was higher at $21.20. These results differ significantly, hinting that the center's gain was on account of the driver's monetary utility. This result is compatible with our previous result in Azaria et al. [2012b] , where people tend to perform better when the agent confronting them assumes that they will act rationally. However, in practice, this issue is not of great concern, because if the center is interested in the driver receiving a higher utility, it may implicitly add the driver's utility to its own utility function and result in a protocol that will be better for both the center and the driver.
6.4.4. One-Sided Uncertainty Versus Two-Sided Uncertainty. In previous work [Azaria et al. 2011] , we tested the performance of LUQA in the road selection problem under the exact same settings, only with full information for the center. Figure 4 shows these results along with our current results with partial information. As can be seen, when LUQA has full information, it significantly outperforms LUQA with partial information. This is not surprising, since additional information allows the Sender to avoid mistakes and encourages the Receiver to take actions that are more favorable to the Sender.
Sandwich Game Results
6.5.1. GTBA Results. The monetary result plays an important role in the sandwich game. This is because the game is played in an environment in which a person's goal is to make as high a revenue as possible, which usually results in selling as many sandwiches as possible while minimizing the number of sandwiches thrown away. Fig. 3 . System utility in road game 2 ρ . The center performed significantly better when using LUQA rather than GTBA ( p < 0.05). Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 5 , the user utility in the sandwich games was very close to the utility of a hypothetical fully rational player.
The policy of GTBA in the first settings ( 1 σ ) included five messages. The organizer received on average 0.260 per seller (Figure 6 ). The utility of the organizer was similar to the expected utility that the organizer would receive if all subjects were rational (i.e., maximizing u r ), which, in expectation, was 0.299 per seller. We suspect that this is due to the important role that the monetary value plays in this game. These results differ from the correspondence results of the road selection game, and thus we hypothesize that LUQA is not needed here and that the GTBA will do as well as LUQA in this domain.
6.5.2. LUQA and the LUQ Human Model. The learning phase for LUQA, which was based on the subjects participating in 1 σ , found the following parameters in the subjective utility function: α 1 , the amount gained by each sandwich sold, was 0.087, and α 2 , the amount lost by each sandwich thrown away, was −0.103. On average (depending on the private type w), if maximizing expected monetary values, people should have been neutral between missing a sandwich and preparing one too many sandwiches; however, it seems that people were a little risk averse since | − 0.103| > |0.087|, but still the numbers are very close. When testing the MSE of LUQ, we get a result similar to that of QRE (quantal response under expected monetary outcome), both yielding 0.07. The Fig. 7 . System utility in sandwich game 2 σ . The difference between the organizer utility when using LUQA and when using GTBA is minor and not statistically significant. similar performance for both LUQ and MSE indicates that people performed nearly rationally, which nearly obviates the use of LUQ.
6.5.3. Comparing LUQA and GTBA. The comparison was done under the second settings ( 2 σ ), and both GTBA and LUQA used four messages. The organizer received on average 0.715 when using GTBA and 0.728 when using LUQA (Figure 7 ). Although LUQA did perform slightly better, these results do not differ significantly. This is not surprising since, as mentioned earlier, the subjects' subjective utility was very close to the expected monetary value and thus the GTBA's assumptions were correct. We suggest that the slight improvement shown was given from the logit quantal response assumption.
Deciding between LUQA and GTBA
As demonstrated in the preceding two games, there are situations where LUQA outperforms GTBA; however, in some situations, they yield similar results. One may recommend to always use LUQA since it is always as good as GTBA and sometimes even better. However, LUQA requires collecting data to learn the human utility function. Therefore, we recommend first collecting some data using GTBA and comparing the agent's results and the human behavior to the rational behavior. If the GTBA's results are significantly different from the expected results that it would have received if people would have followed a rational decision making process, then it is worthwhile to collect more data and use LUQA. Otherwise, using GTBA seems to be a good enough heuristic. It is important to note that in the road selection game, it was enough to use 10 subjects to obtain a significant difference between GTBA and the expected utility if people would have followed rational behavior. In the sandwich game, we did not obtain significant results even with 100 subjects. So collecting 20 to 25 data points for making a decision whether to use LUQA or GTBA seems reasonable.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we consider information disclosure games with two-sided uncertainty in which an agent tries to lead a person to take an action that is beneficial to the agent by providing him with truthful, but possibly partial, information relevant to the action selection. We first provide an algorithm to compute the optimal policy for information disclosure games with two-sided uncertainty, assuming that the human is fully rational. We also provide an innovative machine learning-based model that effectively predicts people's behavior in these games. The model we provide assumes that people use a subjective utility function that is a linear combination for all given attributes. The model also assumes that while people use this function as a guideline, they do not always choose the action with the greatest utility value; however, the higher an action's utility value, the more likely they are to choose that action. We integrate this model into our persuasion model to yield an innovative method of human behavior manipulation. Extensive empirical study in multiattribute road selection games with two-sided uncertainty confirms the advantage of the proposed model in that game. However, in another domain we tested, the sandwich game, there is no significant advantage to the machine learning-based model, and using the GTBA assuming that people maximize their expected monetary values is beneficial. We propose a methodology of how to choose between the two options. We argue that depending on the domain, people's decisionmaking processes may vary and thus where in one domain modeling humans as rational may be good enough, in another domain this model is too far from their actual behavior and therefore an agent assuming perfectly rational behavior may fall far behind.
